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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff, )
vs.

Case No. 8008

JAIVIES L. HENDRICKS,

\

Defendant. ;
!•

.BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Second Judicial
District Court denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
The facts essential to this appeal are as follows:
The defendant, James L. Hendricks, was charged in the
Justice's Court of the North Salt Lake Precinct, before Ann
C. Noble, Justice of the Peace, of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, as set out in the complaint made a part of the record
of this appeal; that preliminary hearing on said charge was

3
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had before said Justice on June 6, 1952; that upon the conclusion of the State's case, the Justice· bound the defendant
over to the District Court to answer to the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Thereafter Glenn W. Adams, District Attorney, issued an information charging the defendant with
the crime of involuntary manslaughter committed as follows,
to-wit: tCThat on the 16th day of May, 1952, the defendant did
then and there wilfully, and unlawfully, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor but without malice, did kill the
said Lula Blanche Jacobs, contrary· to the provisions of Title
103, Chapter 28, Section 5, Utah Code Annotated 1943," to
which information the defendant pleaded not guilty, and trial
was had· before a jury in the court of Judge Parley Norseth;
that the Judge, at the conclusion of th evidence, instructed the
jury as to the law.governing said case. Among the instructions
given were instructions No. 11 and No. 12, which read as
follows:
tCNo. 11
tCMere negligence is not sufficient to justify a verdict of involuntary manslaughter. A· driver of an auto. mobile is not guiJty of manslaughter just because his
vehicle .is an instrumentality by means of which some
one is killed. _Merely failing to see a person in time to
avoid hitting him does not, by itself, show recklessness
or marked disregard for the s~ety of others.
c.cso that, if you believe from the evidence in this case,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not
driving his automobile recklessly or unlawfully or
with a marked disregard for the safety of others~ and
that such manner of driving was not the proxtmate
cause of the accident, then you will not be justifietl
in bringing in a verdict of guilty in this case."

4
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"No. 12
ttYou are instructed that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant was suddenly confronted with a situation of peril which he could not avoid, then you are
instructed to bring in a verdict of not guilty.''
Defendant's counsel took exception to the giving of said
mentioned instructions 11 and 12, and each of them, on the
ground that the same were contrary to law and shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was not driving his automobile negligently and
unlawfully and with a marked disregard for the safety of others,
and that such manner of driving was not the proximate cause
of the accident, and further shifted the burden upon the defendant to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he was suddenly confronted with a situation of peril which he could not
avoid. The jury returned a. verdict of guilty against said defendant upon the instructions given them by the trial court;
that thereafter and within the period fixed by law, the defendant filed a motion for new trial on the ground that the court
had misdirected the jury as a matter of law in giving each
of the named instructions numbered 11 and 12, and on other
grounds; that upon a hearing had on said motion, the court
.overruled defendant's motion and sentenced the defendant
for a term of one year in the county jail. Thereafter the court
signed a certificate of probable cause, and this appeal was
instituted.
The defendant submits the question on the grounds taised
in his motion for a new trial, on all grounds contained therein
5
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except on the overruling of his motion relative to instructions
11 and 12.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC·
TION NO. 11, WHICH· SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO THE. DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS NOT DRIVING
HIS AUTOMOBILE RECKLESSLY OR UNLAWFULLY OR
WITH A MARKED DISREGARD fOR THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS, AND SUCH ERROR IS PREJUDICIAL AND
NOT ·CURED BY THE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE COURT RELATING TO PRESUMPTIONS AND
BURDEN OF PROOF.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12 WHICH SHIFTED THE BURDEN UPON
THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH A
SITUATION OF PERIL WHICH HE COULD NOT AVOID.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC6
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TION NO. 11, WHICH SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS NOT DRIVING
HIS AUTOMOBILE RECKLESSLY OR UNLAWFULLY OR
WITH A MARKED DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS, AND SUCH ERROR IS PREJUDICIAL AND
NOT CURED BY THE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE COURT RELATING TO PRESUMPTIONS AND
BURDEN OF PROOF.

It is the appellant's contention that this instruction is
contrary to law and prejudicial to his cause. The proposition
of law relied upon is firmly established. It is elementary that
in criminal cases the state must assume the burden of proof of
every essential element of the crime, and prove the same beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden rests upon the prosecution at all stages of the trial and never shifts. An instruction
which has the effect of ·shifting the burden· to the defendant
to prove his innocence ttby a preponderance of the evidence,"
or tcbeyond a reasonable doubt" is error.
Reid's Branson Instructions to
53 Am. Jur., Trial Sec. 677

Juri~s,

Sec. 63

Instruction No. 11 is complete, unambiguous and certain.
In substance and effect it instructs the jury that the defendant
must establish his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
inference is that if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether
.the defendant was driving his automobile either recklessly
or unlawfully or with a marked disregard for the safety of
others, then they should find the defendant guilty as charged.
7
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It requires the defendant to assume the burden of proof. It
is to be noted that reckless driving, or unlawful driving (which
woul~ include driving while intoxicated) or driving with a
marked disregard for the safety of others are the very facts
which .the state must_ establish to show the commission. of the
crime. Here the jury .is told that the defendant's evidence. must
be. considered with the state's evidence and the issue of guilt
resolved in favor of the defendant ·only if .his evidence is
sufficient to dispel a reasonable doubt of his innocence. The
jury should have been instructed that if they had a reasonable
doubt as to whether the defendant was driving recklessly,
or unlawfully, or with a marked disregard for the safety of
others, then defendant ·was entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
It is hard to conceive of a more flagrant abuse of the principle
that a defendant in crimina~ cases is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
The Ut~h court was faced with a similar problem in State
v. Laris, 78 U. 183, 2 P (2d) 243 ( 193·1). 'In the Laris case defendant's innocence turned upon the question whether he had
received stolen heifers in go~d faith. He was convicted of larceny in the trial court, and among errors assigned for reversal
was an instruction charging the jury that if they should find
nfrom the evidence" that the defendant purchased and received
the heifers in ccgood faith," then the verdict must be not guilty.
Mr. Justice Hanson, in his opinion reversing the holding of
the trial court, said (at page 249) ;
CCThis instruction . . . cast upon the defendant the
burden of establishing the good faith of the purchase.
As the burden of proof to establish the commission of
a crime necessarily extends to every essential element
8
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of the crime, the burden is, of course, with the state
to overcome that presumption beyond a reasonable
doubt."
In Hudson v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 220, 200 SW (2d)
462 (1947), appellant, a negro boy, was charged with and
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Deceased was a fouryear-old girl and was killed when appellant last control of his
speeding car and drove into a private yard where she was playing. The only defense submitted by the defendant was that
the accelerator had stuck to the floorboard of his car. The
trial court charged that if the jury believed from the evidence
"to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt" that the_ killing resulted otherwise than as set forth in prior instructions, then they
must find the defendant not guilty. The Kentucky court reversed the conviction. In a short opinion which discussed only
this one assignment of error, the court said (at page 463) :
ctObjection is particularly directed at the expression
cto the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.' The pronouncements of this court have been so outstandingly explicit, unmistakable, and unambiguous about the use
of such an expression in a defensive instruction that
it is entirely un!_lecessary to discuss the matter at length."
The court then said, quoting with approval from Jones v.
Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 3~56, 281 SW 164, 166:
" ... Clearly in defensive instructions the jury are
only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are ~ot required to believe such
facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is
prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an
instruction.''
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

The use of the words ccbeyond a reasonable doubt," tcby
a preponderance of the evidence'' and similar phrases in defensive instructions has almost universally been held in error.
People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 52, 198 P (2d) ·865
People v. Settles, 29 Cal. App. 2d 781, 78 P (2d) 274
People v. Roberts, 122 Cal. 377, 55 P 137
State v. Floyd, 220 N.C. 530, 17 SE (2d) 658
Vigorito v. U. S. 54 S. Ct. 373, 290 U.S. 705, 78 L.Ed.
606
Drossos v. U. S. (CCA 8th Cir.) 2 F.2d 538
·collins v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 572, 218 SW (2d)
393
Brewer v. State, 143 Tex. Ct. App. 136, 157 SW (2d)
388
Lively v. State, 150 Tex. Ct. App. 485, 202 SW (2d)
850
Miner v. U.S. (CCA lOth Cir) 57 F. 2d 506
Johnson v. State, 1.05 Texas Ct. App. 811, 20 SW (2d)
832
The appellant concedes that where individual instructions
are to be interpreted, they must be considered in the light of
the whole context and that it is not proper to isolate one or
two instructions. If other instructions are given which clarify
an ambiguity, or supply an omission, or make certain an uncertainty, then the instruction may not be complained of as
prejudicial. Thus in State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40 P (2d) 961,
the court held that a questionable instruction was cured. In
the Green case defendant pleaded insanity to a charge of first
degree murder. The trial court instructed that such a defense
was proper and legitimate ccif proved." In commenting upon
the instructio~, Mr. Chief Justice Hanson wrote (at page 964):
10
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nThe use of the words tif proved' in that instruction
is not free from objection, but, in ligpt of the fact that
in a number of other instructions the court repeatedly
informed the jury that the defendant was entitled to
an acquittal if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt
as to his sanity at the time in question, we are unable
to perceive how the jury could have been misled by
the objectionable language."
It is to be noted, however, that in the Green case the clarifying
instructions were directed specifically to the subject matter
of the erroneous instruction. The rule is not the same where a .
general instruction is relied upon to cure an erroneous one.
It is a common rule of construction that where a general and
a specific passage conflict, the more specific or particular pass~
age should be followed. Hence, where the specific instruction
is the erroneous one, it is not only impossible to tell which of
the instructions, general or specific,· the jury followed in their
deliberations, .but the presumption would be that the jury
followed the erroneous specific instruction. In the first appeal
of the Green case, State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P (2d) 177
( 1931), the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial.
In explaining the rule with respect to conflicting instructions,
the court quoted with approval from Jensen v. Utah RR Co.,
72 U. 366, 270 P 349, 355 (at page 183):
where instructions are in irreconcilable conflict, or so conflicting as to confuse or misiead the jury,
the rule requiring instructions to be read together has
no application."
H

•••

and
t' . . . the giving of inconsistent instructions is error
and sufficient ground for reversal of the judgment,
because, after verdict, it cannot be told which instruc11
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tion was -followed by the jury, or what influence the
erroneous instruction had on their deliberations . . ."
This same line of reasoning was employed in State v. W aid,
92 U. 297, 67 P (2d) 647, where the court gathered the controlling Utah cases on the question.
A case similar to the present one is Drossos v. United
States, 2 F 2d 538 (CCA 8th Cir.) This was an appeal from a
conviction in the Federal District Court of Utah. The district
court charged the jury, ((if you are convinced by the evidence
introduced in behalf of the defendant, then you should acquit .... " ·The respondent relied upon a general instruction
which properly charged the jury as to the presumption of innocence and burden of proof. In reversing the conviction, the
court said (at page 539) :

ttlt is of course also true, and well settled by the
authorities, that a charge to a jury is to be considered
as a whole, and that if the instructions as a series correctly state the law, then though one paragraph or one
phrase st~nding alone may be defective, it will not
constitute reversible error. ·But that is not the rule
where two instructions are directly in conflict and one
of them clearly erroneous and prejudicial, such as is
presented here, for the jury will assume that the instructions are all correct and will as likely follow the
incorrect as the correct instruction." (Citing authorities).
This part of the opinion was cited with approval by our Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Laris, 78 U. 183, 2 P (2d) 243, 249 .
.Perhaps the most recently reported case in point is State
12
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v. Cummings, ---- N.M. ____ , 253 P (2d) 321 (Jan. 28, 1953).
In this case defendant was convicted of involuntry manslaughter. There was testimony to the effect that defendant at the
time of the accident was driving at an excessive rate of speed
and that he was intoxicated. The trial court instructed the jury
that if they should· find ((after a fair preponderance of the
evidence'' that the defendant was driving at an excessive rate
of speed and while drunk, then they would be warranted in finding a verdict of guilty. The Supreme Court ruled that this
instruction was calculated to confuse and mislead the jury and
was uhurtful" to the defendant. Judgment was reversed and
the cause remanded for a new trial. The court said, at page
322, quoting from State v. Crosby, 26 N.M. 3t18, 191 P 1079,
1081:
uwe believe the proper rule to be that error committed in giving an incorrect instruction is not cured or
rendered harmless by the giving of a correct instruction
on the same subject, and this rule. should be applied
in the present case, in which the erroneous instruction
was complete, unambiguous, and certain."
A search has revealed no significant cases in which an -in- .
struction which shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts · which if proved
would negative guilt, has been cured by a general instruction
of the court on the proper rule of burden of proof. See:

People v. Roe, 189 Cal. _548, 209 P 560;
People ·v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2nd 52, 198 P (2d) 865;
Nicola v. United States, 72 F 2d 78 (CCA) 3rd Cir.);
State v. Floyd, 220 N.C. 530, 17 SE (2d) 658;
Orlando v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 836, 292 SW 497.
13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12 WHICH SHIFTED THE BURDEN UPON
THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH A
SITUATION OF PERIL WHICH HE COULD NOT A\'010.
Appellant contends that this instruction was calculated
to confuse and mislead the jury. The propositions of law
elicited in the argument of Assignment of Error No. I render
an instruction such as this not only erroneous and prejudicial,
but contrary to a basic principle of American criminal law
(i.e., the presumption of innocence attending the defendant at
all stages of the trial).
It is submitted that evidence of weather conditions, me·chanical condition of the windshield wiper of appellant's automobile, and the fact that apparently neither the deceased nor
appellant saw each other in time to avoid the collision and that
in fact no attempt was made to avoid such collision, may all
have contributed to raising a reasonable doubt in the minds
of the jury as to the defendant's guilt, in which case he should
have been acquitt~d. The effect of Instruction No. 12 is to make
it incumbent upon appellant to affirmatively show beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was confronted with such a situation
of peril. Here again the presumption as to defendant's innocence is improperly resolved in favor of the state.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that Instructions Nos. 11 and 12 given by the
1,j
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trial court shifted the burden to the defendant to prove his
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Such instructions were
prejudicial to the defendant, and they were not cured by the
general instructions given by the court on reasonable doubt.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the conviction should
be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE

Attorney for Appellant
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